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SIR PHILIP DE ZULUETA1 
 
 
It is perhaps one measure of the perceived importance of the position of private 
secretary for foreign affairs to the Prime Minister at the time that the first 
mention of Sir Philip Francis de Zulueta in Who’s Who, that listing of the great 
and good, was in 1964 after he had moved on from that situation to more 
lucrative opportunities in the City.2 This, however, is not necessarily surprising. 
Being a private secretary had, after all, long been a very junior position in the 
diplomatic service, often combining the duties of secretarial support with those 
of a general factotum.3 What won Philip the attention of Who’s Who was not his 
job but the knighthood he was given in 1963: within the hierarchy of the 
Foreign Office he remained a comparatively young man in a commensurate 
role. Philip had only just turned 39 when he embarked on what turned out to be 
a high-flying second career in business, having been born on 2 January 1925 in 
Oxford.  
 
Both diplomacy and business might be said to have been in the blood. The de 
Zuluetas were a Basque family who became established as bankers and traders 
in the southern Spanish port of Cadiz in the mid-eighteenth century. There they 
became embroiled in the tumultuous Spanish politics during and immediately 
after the French revolutionary wars. Philip’s great-great grandfather, Pedro 
Juan, was briefly president of the Cortes de Cadiz in the summer of 1823 just 
before a French invasion enabled Ferdinand VII to repudiate the liberal 
constitution of 1812 and turn on his enemies.4 Pedro Juan fled to Liverpool and 
re-established his banking and shipping interests there and in London. At the 
end of the 1820s there was an application for British citizenship on the grounds 
that Zulueta & Co was now well-established in the City, whence they had come 
in order more effectively to carry on their commerce with the newly-
independent colonies of South America than was then possible from their native 
Spain.5 After Ferdinand’s death in 1833, however, Pedro Juan came back into 
favour in Spain, being appointed Condé de Torre Diaz in 1846.  
1 I am grateful for the assistance of Vernon Bogdanor, Max Egremont, Sir Guy Millard, Walter Rønning, D. R. 
Thorpe and Lady de Zulueta in the preparation of this chapter. 
2 Who’s Who (London: A. & C. Black, 1964), p.3389. 
3 See Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh Descent to Suez: Diaries 1951-56 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986), pp.4-6. 
4 British and Foreign State Papers 1822-1823, (London: J. Harrison, 1828), pp.981-2. 
5 The National Archives, London [henceforward TNA]: HO 1/10/22. 
                                                          
By then Zulueta & Co was being run by his eldest son, Philip’s great-
grandfather, Pedro José. He had become a British subject in 1836, the year he 
married Sophie Anna Wilcox, the daughter of Brodie Wilcox, one of the 
founders of the P&O shipping line in 1834. Pedro José was clearly well-
connected in the City, but also had some more dubious contacts, including his 
cousin Julian, who acted for the firm in Havana and was the largest slave-trader 
in the Spanish empire. The slave trade had been outlawed in Britain in 1807 and 
consolidating legislation in 1824 further made trading with slavers illegal, but 
only if conducted with prior knowledge. It was this proviso which proved 
instrumental in securing Pedro José’s acquittal in 1843 when he was arraigned 
at the Old Bailey in a celebrated trial for his firm’s role in financing and 
equipping the voyage of the Augusta via Cadiz to the notorious slaving station 
of Gallinas on behalf of the equally-notorious slaver Pedro Martinez.  
 
Pedro José’s somewhat cynical view expressed in his subsequent publication 
about the trial was that laws to control the end-use of commerce were 
impossible to police and, in an age when slavery was still legal in many 
territories, in any case undesirable. These views had some resonances in 
Philip’s time, considering American attempts to discourage British trade with 
Communist states like Cuba. They were clearly widely-shared amongst Pedro 
José’s fellow bankers in the City, where Zulueta & Co remained active until 
closed for family reasons in 1915.6 Meanwhile, his second son and Philip’s 
grandfather, Pedro Juan, moved into a different field. He served in the Spanish 
diplomatic service from 1866-88 and was first secretary of the Spanish embassy 
in London in the 1870s when he married Laura Mary, the daughter of Sir Justin 
Sheil, a former British ambassador to Persia.7 It was in that embassy, and thus 
on Spanish soil, that Philip’s father, Francis, was born on 12 September 1878.  
 
Francis, unusually, was neither a businessman nor a diplomat. He was instead a 
distinguished classicist, academic and Egyptologist. At the time of Philip’s birth 
he was Fellow of All Souls in Oxford and also Regius Professor of Civil Law at 
6 Trial of Pedro de Zulueta Jun. on a charge of slave trading, (London: C. Wood & Co., 1844), preface; Marika 
Sherwood, ‘”Oh, what a tangled web we weave”: Britain, the slave trade and slavery 1808-43’, Shunpiking 
(2007) [http://shunpiking.com/bhs2007/200-BHS-MS-BritishStrade.htm accessed 20 November 2012]. 
7 The Catholic Who’s Who 
[http://archive.org/stream/catholicwhoswho00burn/catholicwhoswho00burn_djvu.txt accessed 20 November 
2012]. 
                                                          
that university.8 Spanish citizenship had been no hindrance to such 
advancements. It did, however, prevent Francis from identifying with his 
adopted country by rallying to the colours in 1914. It was in this emergency that 
Francis now applied for naturalisation, urging haste before he became too old 
for military service and writing ‘I do not see how one can avoid army service as 
a matter of honour’.9 He served in the Worcestershire Regiment throughout the 
First World War, rising to the rank of captain in 1916, before returning to 
Oxford in 1919. 
 
Philip inherited a number of useful skills from his father. Francis was 
linguistically gifted and gregarious. He also passed on his devout Catholicism to 
his only child. One of his cousins was Cardinal Rafael Merry del Val, the 
secretary of the Congregation of the Holy Office from 1914 until his death in 
1930. Another, Rafael’s elder brother Alfonso, was Spanish ambassador to the 
Court of St James 1913-31.10 These familial connections with Catholic and 
royalist Spain were clearly important both to Francis and to Philip and help to 
explain Francis’ support for Franco during the 1936-9 Spanish Civil War. Philip 
accordingly grew up in a very conservative household and followed his father’s 
footsteps via the Jesuit private school of Beaumont College in Berkshire – 
where he was head boy – to New College, Oxford. By then the Second World 
War was already raging. Whilst Francis pursued good works, aiding Polish and 
Jewish refugees, Philip began his studies not in law but modern history. As soon 
as he was able, in 1943, he joined the Welsh Guards. For the rest of his life he 
shared with his future boss, Harold Macmillan, who had served in the Grenadier 
Guards in the First World War, a strong identification as a guardsman.11 As a 
tank commander he participated in the liberation of the Netherlands. Like his 
father, Philip rose to the rank of captain in 1945. After two years’ service in 
occupied Europe Philip left the army in 1947 and returned to Oxford to 
complete his degree, leaving with a third class in jurisprudence in 1948. It was 
not that he lacked Francis’s brilliance so much as the difficulty of returning to 
8 F. H. Lawson ‘Francis de Zulueta (1878-1958)’ in New Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), vol. 60, pp.1021-2; Who’s Who (London: A. & C. Black, 1925), p.3163. According to 
Adrian Hastings, A History of English Christianity 1920-1990 3rd ed., (London: SCM Press, 1991), pp.138-9 
Francis was the leading Catholic in inter-war Oxford. 
9 TNA: HO 144/104, Francis de Zulueta to Bannatyne, 29 August 1914. 
10  Catholic Who’s Who. 
11 On the camaraderie of this background see Peter Catterall (ed) The Macmillan Years: The Cabinet Years 
1950-1957 (London: Macmillan, 2003), p.231 (7 May 1953); Simon Ball, The Guardsmen: Harold Macmillan, 
Three Friends and the World they made (London: HarperCollins, 2004). 
                                                          
university life after the war.12 With his father’s encouragement, Philip still read 
for the Bar, but his aptitude lay elsewhere.13 Luckily for him there was heavy 
recruitment to the Foreign Service in the aftermath of the war: instead of the 
second class honours degree normally required as standard for entrants to 
Branch A – the senior ranks of the service known as the administrative class – 
candidates had to demonstrate their capability to pass this and to acquire 
linguistic competence. Philip spoke flawless French but still had to pass the 
written examination and surmount the various personality tests during the 
country house weekend used to assess entrants.14 Having done so, he was 
appointed a grade 9 officer, also known as a Third Secretary, on 13 October 
1949.15 
 
In common with about half the new entrants of the period, Philip swiftly was 
given his first overseas posting, being sent to Moscow on 28 January 1950.16 
There he served as private secretary to the ambassador, Sir David Kelly. A later 
diplomat opined that Third Secretaries are ‘treated as skivvies’ by their 
ambassadors.17 It is likely that Philip’s experience was little different. Certainly, 
in the lengthy memoir Kelly wrote immediately at the end of what was his last 
diplomatic posting, whilst he comments in some detail the Russian secret 
service bodyguards who accompanied him – and indeed Philip on his one 
attempt to see something of Russia – everywhere, there is no discussion of any 
of his staff.18 On the other hand, as Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh noted of his 
experiences skivvying for Sir Miles Lampson in Egypt in the 1930s, Private 
Secretaries nevertheless ‘are given responsibilities well beyond their years and 
enjoy the acquaintance of interesting people in every walk of life long before 
they could otherwise expect it’.19 Such experiences no doubt helped to prepare 
Philip for when he later succeeded to Shuckburgh’s sometime role as Private 
Secretary to Sir Anthony Eden. So did the knowledge of Russian he acquired. 
12 Interview: Lady de Zulueta, 24 October 2012. 
13 Lawson, p.1022; Max Egremont, ‘Sir Philip Francis de Zulueta (1925-1989)’ in New Dictionary of National 
Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), vol. 60, p.1023. 
14 Lord (William) Strang, The Foreign Office (London: Allen & Unwin, 1955), pp.79-80; Lord (William) Strang, 
The Diplomatic Career (London: André Deutsch, 1962), pp.36-9, 45; Alistair Horne, Macmillan 1957-1986 
(London: Macmillan, 1989), p.161. 
15 Foreign Office List (1951), p.506. 
16 Strang, The Diplomatic Career, p.42; Foreign Office List (1952), p.526. 
17 Quoted in Geoffrey Moorhouse, The Diplomats: The Foreign Office Today (London: Jonathan Cape, 1977), 
p.47. 
18 Sir David Kelly, The Ruling Few or the Human Background to Diplomacy (London: Hollis & Carter, 1952), 
pp.369-72. 
19 Shuckburgh, p.7. 
                                                          
Language education was then the main form of training the Foreign Office 
provided.20 Philip, however, had little time to enjoy the £100 a year allowance 
granted him for his Russian skills on 31 October 1951. These allowances were 
only payable when serving in the field, and Philip returned to London on 4 
February 1952.21 The only overseas posting of his diplomatic career had ended. 
 
The Foreign Office back in London was then divided into some 30 departments 
which had functional, territorial, administrative or miscellaneous 
responsibilities. Philip was placed in the General Department, whose role was to 
advise the Foreign Secretary on broad policy relating to civil aviation, shipping, 
telecommunications, international post, meteorology, fishing, safety at sea or 
locust control. These departments were small teams, in which junior 
responsibility was given to Second or even Third Secretaries. Having been 
promoted to Second Secretary (grade 8) on his 28th birthday, Philip was given 
responsibility for civil aviation.22 He also, however, clearly acquired some 
miscellaneous duties as well, including an attachment to the Brazilian 
representative at the Coronation in June 1953. This seems to have given him on 
the grounds that his Spanish language would be useful in dealing with the 
lusophone Brazilians, though in practice all his conversations with them were in 
French. The appointment did, however, give him his first encounter with his 
future wife who, sharing his linguistic facility with French and Spanish, was 
also helping the Brazilians and literally ran into him on the stairs one day.23 
Then, on 1 September 1953, he became a Resident Clerk.24 
 
Some years later Geoffrey Moorhouse noted that the six Resident Clerks of the 
1970s were generally at the rank of First Secretary (grade 7), a rank Philip did 
not obtain until 5 March 1957. Philip may have risen more rapidly because of 
the war-induced gaps in the ranks. The four Resident Clerks of his day occupied 
flats in the eaves of the Foreign Office with spectacular views over St James’ 
Park, taking it in turns to be on night duty dealing with any issues that might 
arise. Because of the unsocial nature of the job they were given a special 
allowance and necessarily expected to be unmarried.25 Accordingly, it was not 
20 Moorhouse, p.76. 
21 Foreign Office List (1953), p.545; (1954), p.126. 
22 Strang, The Foreign Office p.209; Strang, The Diplomatic Career pp.82, 87; Foreign Office List (1953), p.67; 
(1954), p.481. 
23 Interview: Lady de Zulueta, 24 October 2012. 
24 Foreign Office List (1955), p.482. 
25 Foreign Office List (1958), p.481; Moorhouse, pp.18-19; Strang, The Diplomatic Career p.45. 
                                                          
until after he left this role in 1955 that Philip married Marie-Louise, the eldest 
daughter of the 2nd Baron Windlesham. They proved a devoted couple, and 
Philip immensely valued his wife’s judgement.26 
 
It was this post as Resident Clerk that gave Philip some significant patrons. The 
Resident Clerks came under the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department 
established in 1948 which managed liaison with the Ministry of Defence, the 
Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Planning Staff and the Joint Intelligence Committee 
[JIC]. The chairman of the JIC at the time was Patrick Dean, one of the two 
Assistant Under-Secretaries responsible for this department, whilst the head of 
department was Geoffrey McDermott.27 The position also involved liaison at 
the highest level, for instance through passing on drafts to the Foreign 
Secretary; the resulting sense of policy influence helping to compensate for the 
unsocial hours.28 It certainly must have given Philip a chance to attract attention 
at those highest levels such that, when the Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, 
succeeded Churchill as Prime Minister on 12 April 1955 he took Philip with 
him to Downing Street. Philip, however, had not previously met Eden. It was 
Eden’s private secretary, Anthony Rumbold, who recommended Philip for the 
position. Rumbold stayed at the Foreign Office to serve the new Secretary of 
State, Harold Macmillan, until replaced by P. F. Hancock in September 1955.29 
Philip, meanwhile, was now officially seconded to the Treasury in order to 
serve in the Prime Minister’s private office.30  
 
The Number 10 private office Philip then joined was four strong headed by 
David Pitblado.31 Guy Millard, a future ambassador to Italy, was the other 
member from a diplomatic background, having preceded Philip to Number 10 
by six days. Millard was considerably senior to Philip in the diplomatic service, 
having served as an assistant private secretary to Foreign Secretary Eden in 
1941-45. He accordingly knew Eden – his son’s godfather – well and had been 
invited to join him in Number 10. The other member of the team was Freddie 
26 Email from Lord Egremont, 18 September 2012. 
27 Foreign Office List (1954), p.45; Geoffrey McDermott, The Eden Legacy and the Decline of British Diplomacy 
(London: Leslie Frewin, 1969), p.138; W. Scott Lucas ‘The Missing Link? Patrick Dean, Chairman of the Joint 
Intelligence Committee’ in Saul Kelly and Anthony Gorst (eds) Whitehall and the Suez Crisis (London: Frank 
Cass, 2000), p.118. 
28 Shuckburgh, p.20; Moorhouse, p.18. 
29 Foreign Office List (1956), pp.45, 407. 
30 Foreign Office List (1955), p.482. 
31 Apparently Kennedy could not believe that the Prime Minister got by with so few staff; Interview: Lady de 
Zulueta, 24 October 2012. 
                                                          
Bishop. He had previously, in 1953-55, been in the Cabinet Office dealing with 
the economic business of the Cabinet and the organisation of its committees. 
This was invaluable experience for the private office which stood Bishop in 
good stead when in early 1956 he succeeded Pitblado as Principal Private 
Secretary, being replaced in his turn by Neil Cairncross, who specialised in 
advising on answering Prime Minister’s questions. Despite his background as a 
home civil servant Bishop played a major role in advising the Prime Minister on 
foreign affairs and accompanying him on overseas visits throughout his time in 
the private office until his move back to the Cabinet Office in the summer of 
1959 as deputy secretary. Accordingly Philip was at the time only the most 
junior of several foreign policy advisers in the private office.32  
 
Initially Philip’s chances to shine in foreign affairs were accordingly limited. It 
was Millard who was taken to Geneva with Eden for the Indo-China talks in 
July 1955, whilst Philip merely managed correspondence between this 
delegation and the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office.33 It was also 
Millard – having served in Ankara from 1949-54 – who liaised in 1955 with 
Shuckburgh, the latter being then responsible for the Levant, Arabian and 
Eastern departments of the Foreign Office dealing with the Middle Eastern 
policy problems which were to so overshadow Eden’s premiership. 
Furthermore, Philip was serving a Prime Minister who, as Shuckburgh noted, 
was himself something of a professional diplomat who could not forebear 
interfering in Foreign Office affairs, bombarding his successor with telegrams 
even when at home in Broadchalke ‘where he has no room for a Private 
Secretary’.34 
 
At the Foreign Office Eden had already acquired a reputation of relying on his 
own judgement and irascibility.35 His health problems certainly could make 
Eden a demanding master both in terms of the medications he required and his 
tendency to imitate Churchill’s penchant for bedroom dictation to his staff.36 It 
is clear that Shuckburgh felt that the situation became worse after Eden’s 
32 D. R. Thorpe, Eden: The Life and Times of Anthony Eden, First Earl of Avon 1897-1977 (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 2003), p. 443; Daily Telegraph 14 March 2005, obituary of Sir Frederick Bishop; Telephone 
conversation with Sir Guy Millard, 28 August 2012. 
33 TNA: PREM11/1310. 
34 Shuckburgh, pp.11-12; p.277 (31 August 1955); p.314 (19 December 1955). 
35 Avi Shlaim, Peter Jones and Keith Sainsbury, British Foreign Secretaries since 1945 (Newton Abbot: David & 
Charles, 1977), p.87. 
36 Shuckburgh, pp.10, 14, 326. 
                                                          
translation to Number 10, noting in his diary on 31 January 1956: ‘I can see no 
prospect of my ever being intimate with him again, and I don’t think his present 
Private Secretaries like him enough to want to be.’37  
 
Shuckburgh’s source was presumably his friend Millard. Millard, however, has 
no recollection of such personal difficulties.38 The warm personal 
correspondence both he and Philip kept up for years with Eden after the latter 
left office, including visits for lunch with the former Prime Minister whenever 
Eden’s health permitted, certainly suggests sustained good friendship. Indeed, 
some months after Eden’s resignation, Philip wrote to tell Eden: ‘All your 
former private secretaries very much including Bobby [Allan MP], miss you 
greatly’.39 
 
Millard also clearly had some influence on Eden’s policy towards the Middle 
East: in the run-up to Eden’s January 1956 Washington visit Millard stressed to 
the Prime Minister the need for economic counters to the Soviet penetration of 
the region marked by the Egyptian arms deal announced the previous 
September.40 Shuckburgh was thus too critical of Eden’s relations with the 
private office. Its standard roles continued unimpaired: of managing liaison with 
ministers and officials; keeping up records; preparing drafts of correspondence 
and speeches; and superintending the cabinet committee system in conjunction 
with the Cabinet Office. An example of this last duty was Philip’s advice to the 
Prime Minister that a Cabinet committee was not necessary on university 
expansion – demonstrating as well that his role was never confined to foreign 
affairs.41 
 
Eden also used his private secretaries as occasional sounding-boards for ideas.42 
He seems to have taken Philip into his confidence even on some domestic 
matters, for instance on the mistake of combining the Leadership of the 
Commons with the Conservative party chairmanship.43 Eden would also allow 
them to express his sentiments: for instance, on the desirability of making sure 
37 Shuckburgh, p.331. 
38 Telephone conversation with Sir Guy Millard, 28 August 2012. 
39 Cadbury Research Library, University of Birmingham: Avon Papers [henceforward AP], 23/67/1, de Zulueta 
to Eden, 24 April 1957. Allan was Eden’s Parliamentary Private Secretary. 
40 TNA: PREM11/1334, Millard to Eden, 3 January 1956. 
41 TNA: PREM11/2283, de Zulueta to Eden, 22 February 1956. 
42 Thorpe, Eden p.498. 
43 Department of Western Manuscripts, Bodleian Library, Oxford [henceforward DWM]: MS Macmillan, c310, 
f.49, de Zulueta to Macmillan, 28 May 1962. 
                                                          
that the Americans appreciated the importance to Britain of linkage between the 
1955 Anglo-American Alpha Plan to tackle Israeli-Egyptian relations and the 
compensating offer of tanks for Iraq. Philip’s expression of this, however, was 
regarded by the Foreign Secretary’s assistant private secretary, Andrew Stark, 
as ‘somewhat elliptical’.44 
 
This was a relatively rare foray then by Philip into Middle East policy, which 
seems to have remained Millard’s fiefdom until the end of the Eden 
premiership. Otherwise evidence of Philip acting as more than an efficient 
manager of communications and liaison between the Prime Minister and the 
Foreign Office – for instance in terms of drafting British views on Nehru’s 
somewhat vacuous principles of international relations – is scant.45 When this 
does start to appear there are hints of the significance of his Soviet experiences, 
for instance in influencing the distribution list for a telegram interpreting the 
latest Delphic utterances from Moscow.46 He does not seem, however, to have 
been involved in the exploratory four power talks that briefly flourished in 1955 
following the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty.47 Such talks became for 
Eden even more expedient after the Soviet arms deal with Egypt and culminated 
in the visit to Britain of Bulganin and Khrushchev in April 1956. Previous 
private secretaries, notably Jock Colville during the Second World War, had 
been used as interpreters in such circumstances. Philip’s Russian skills, 
however, were initially kept quiet, which enabled him to follow the visitors’ 
conversation without their knowing and pass on any details to Eden. Other 
interpreters were used, with damaging outcomes as a result of drunkenness at 
the Foreign Secretary’s lunch for the visiting dignitaries on 25 April 1956. 
Khrushchev, however, had picked up on Philip’s mastery of Russian by the end 
of the visit.48 
 
Philip also used his Russian later that year in response to Bulganin’s letter 
implying that Britain was being dragged into the Suez imbroglio to help the 
French out in tackling their war against nationalists in Algeria. There was much 
truth in Bulganin’s observations, but Philip’s role was confined to suggesting, 
without fully checking the Russian, that there might be significance in the 
44 Quoted in Richard Lamb, The Failure of the Eden Government (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1987), p.167. 
45 TNA: PREM11/1303. 
46 TNA: PREM11/1341, Jack Ward to de Zulueta, 13 January 1956. 
47 On the principles behind these see Catterall, The Cabinet Years, p.420 (5 May 1955). 
48 Interview: Lady de Zulueta, 24 October 2012; Thorpe, Eden, pp.470-1. 
                                                          
textual differences between the three versions of the letter received, a 
suggestion dismissed by his Foreign Office counterpart.49 This might be an 
example of the rivalry sometimes detected between the Foreign Office and 
those who have left it to serve in Number 10 or the Cabinet Office, a rivalry 
which arguably grew with perceptions of Philip’s influence the longer he stayed 
at the former.50 At the time it hardly furnished evidence of his influence; in this 
whole long file on the background to the Suez crisis this exchange is the only 
sign of Philip’s involvement. 
 
Earlier that month Philip pithily summarised a seven page telegram from 
Egypt’s President Nasser on the crisis prompted by the Egyptian nationalisation 
of the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956: ‘This is Nasser’s reply. There is nothing 
new in it and it is an unequivocal rejection of international control.’51 However, 
much of the policy support for Suez in the private office fell on Millard. Millard 
would interpret at meetings with the French Prime Minister and Foreign 
Secretary, Guy Mollet and Christian Pineau and was present on 14 October 
when General Challe came over from Paris to unfold for Eden the scheme of 
collusion with the Israelis. Eden also turned to Millard for guidance on the 
course of the Suez events for his memoirs.52 This included advice on the 
atmosphere ‘at Downing Street during the Suez time. Have you any comments 
to suggest, apart from bad language?’53 
 
 
Neither Millard nor Philip had much sympathy with the doubts about the 
ensuing military operations against Egypt launched on 5 November 1956 
expressed by the Prime Minister’s press secretary, William Clark, who resigned 
on 6 November 1956.54 Later that day, under enormous financial pressure from 
the Americans, Eden called the operations off, resigning the following year, 
when he was replaced as Prime Minister by Macmillan. Writing privately a few 
49 TNA: FO371/119138, de Zulueta to John Graham, 14 September 1956; Graham to de Zulueta, 25 September 
1956. 
50 Moorhouse, p.134; Anne Deighton, ‘British Foreign Policy-Making: The Macmillan Years’ in Wolfram Kaiser 
and Gillian Staerck (eds) British Foreign Policy 1955-64: Contracting Options (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 
pp.5-6. 
51 Lamb, The Failure of the Eden Government p.204. 
52 AP: 24/49/1, Eden to Millard, 8 October 1957. 
53 AP: 24/49/6, Eden to Millard, 1 July 1958. Any comments Millard gave do not seem to have survived on 
paper. 
54 Thorpe, Eden pp.498, 532; Lamb, The Failure of the Eden Government p.261; telephone conversation with Sir 
Guy Millard, 28 August 2012. 
                                                          
months later to welcome Eden’s apparent return to health after the strains of 
Suez, Philip made clear his broad support for the Suez strategy: 
 
I believe the Americans are slowly and painfully being brought to accept 
facts and that the Israelis are naturally less jittery than they were before 
Nasser’s power was broken….But there is still no way of meeting 
Nasser’s act of force by negotiation and one can only hope that in the end 
he will succumb to the pressures building up against him and that 
meanwhile he will fail to overthrow our friends.55 
 
Despite his Russian background, however, Philip did not mention here the 
anxieties about Soviet penetration of the Middle East that featured so highly 
amongst Eden’s concerns.56 
 
By then Millard had resigned on 31 December 1956 for personal reasons. Partly 
because of a bad skiing accident at Kitzbuhl he had to endure nine months 
gardening leave and a two year sabbatical in the Paymaster-General’s office 
supporting Reginald Maudling’s abortive attempts to negotiate a European Free 
Trade Area [FTA] before resuming his diplomatic career.57 It did not take 
Millard long correctly to surmise that these efforts would achieve little.58 Philip, 
in contrast, seems to have been one of those encouraging the new Prime 
Minister to continue to believe – even with the return of Charles de Gaulle to 
power in Paris – that German-French differences were such that these efforts 
had a realistic chance of success.59  
 
Millard’s departure meant that Macmillan inherited a depleted private office 
headed by Bishop and supported on the foreign policy side by Philip and on the 
domestic side (until 1958) by Cairncross. On 27 May 1957 Macmillan, having 
survived the post-Suez crisis, decided to strengthen this team by appointing his 
old wartime aide and friend, John Wyndham, as an unpaid supplementary 
private secretary who could take on the political as well as the administrative 
work. Wyndham regarded his new civil service colleagues as both loyal and 
55 AP: 23/67/1, de Zulueta to Eden, 24 April 1957. 
56 See AP: 20/5, diary entry, 2 January 1957. 
57 AP: 23/67/1, de Zulueta to Eden, 24 April 1957; 24/49/7, Millard to Eden, 20 July 1958; telephone 
conversation with Sir Guy Millard, 28 August 2012. 
58 AP: 24/49/5, Millard to Eden, 22 May 1958. 
59 Horne, p.35; Martin P. C. Schaad, Bullying Bonn: Anglo-German Diplomacy on European Integration 1955-61 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), p.93. 
                                                          
effective and by all accounts it was a happy team. For Macmillan they were his 
eyes and ears, controlling access to the Prime Minister from their adjoining 
offices adjacent to the Cabinet room on the first floor of Number 10.60  
 
There was ‘a great volume and variety of business’ with which all the private 
secretaries, regardless of specialism, required considerable familiarity. This was 
not least because of the duty rota, with the last one on duty each evening 
designated to close the box of papers from the day, which was then taken up to 
the Prime Minister’s bedroom, to be returned the following morning with each 
paper duly annotated by Macmillan. There was also ‘the Dip’ – consisting of 
carbon copies of letters and minutes from the day before with which the private 
office were expected to be au fait – and Macmillan’s ‘Bits and Pieces Box’, into 
which went quips and good material for future prime ministerial speeches. 
Macmillan was the first Prime Minister to travel abroad extensively and this 
private office set-up, usually including Philip, would accompany him on these 
journeys.61 Indeed, the job of the private office, like that of courtiers to a 
peripatetic mediaeval king, was very much one of following their master on his 
travels or from Number 10 to Chequers to the Prime Minister’s room in the 
Commons. 
 
According to Wyndham, the private office could be quite as ruthless as 
Macmillan himself when interfering with the departments of state.62 Harold 
Evans, who had replaced Clark as press secretary at Number 10, where he was 
physically located within the private office, certainly later described Philip as  
 
[P]ossessing a formidable array of gifts and talents – intellectual agility, 
charm, self-confidence to the point of arrogance and a readiness to be 
ruthless. Even the Prime Minister could be heard speaking jokingly of 
‘that bully Philip’. 
 
Evans nevertheless closed this examination of Philip’s qualities with ‘From my 
point of view he was never anything but helpful and considerate’.63 
 
60 Horne, pp.11-12, 160; Lord Egremont (John Wyndham), Wyndham and Children First (London: Macmillan, 
1968), pp.162-3, 165-6. 
61 Wyndham, pp.168-9, 177. 
62 Wyndham, p.167. 
63 Harold Evans, Downing Street Diary: The Macmillan Years 1957/63 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1981), 
p.30. 
                                                          
Macmillan would use these various qualities for his own ends. He later 
observed, based on his own experiences, that ‘every Foreign Secretary must 
accept a great measure of interest, or even interference, from the Prime Minister 
of the day’.64 Philip’s role included carrying this interference out on 
Macmillan’s behalf, and sometimes justifying it to the Foreign Secretary 
afterwards. Selwyn Lloyd, who had succeeded Macmillan to that post in 1955, 
for instance, very much resented the way in which he felt Philip and Bishop 
influenced Macmillan’s personal efforts – excluding him – to try to save the 
Paris summit in 1960.65 
 
To play this role Philip had to acquire Macmillan’s trust. This he clearly 
achieved, being described – alongside Bishop and Cabinet Secretary, Sir 
Norman Brook – as a ‘tower of strength’ in Macmillan’s memoirs.66 Wyndham 
explains this role by saying: 
 
The private secretary should seek to protect his Minister at all times and 
also to run a two-way traffic in ideas, which means having the confidence 
not only of the Minister but of everybody else with whom he has 
business. With all of them he must be absolutely straight. Above all he 
must understand his Minister’s mind. When the Minister has a ‘bright 
idea’ the private secretary should know instinctively how best to deal 
with it….This is where a good private secretary comes in. He touts the 
Minister’s ideas around and with complete honesty he reports back on the 
reactions.67 
 
That Philip did indeed deserve Macmillan’s tribute and successfully played this 
role of liaising with the Foreign Secretary and Foreign Office was in the 1970s 
widely and unanimously confirmed by both ministers and officials.68 
 
Specific examples of Philip acting as the influential ‘tower of strength’ of repute 
and the Macmillan memoirs are, however, not always easy to find. In the period 
up to the 1959 election for instance, during which Bishop continued to play a 
considerable role in foreign policy advice, Macmillan appreciated Philip’s help 
64 Harold Macmillan, Tides of Fortune 1945-1955 (London: Macmillan, 1969), p.529. 
65 D. R. Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd (London: Jonathan Cape, 1989), pp.303-4. 
66 Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm 1956-1959 (London: Macmillan, 1971), p.192. 
67 Wyndham, p.189. 
68 Shlaim et al, p.240. 
                                                          
in responding to the concerns of the Leader of the Opposition, Hugh Gaitskell, 
about the 1958 Quemoy crisis between the US and China. Macmillan also notes 
that Philip’s Russian proved useful on his trip to the Soviet Union in 1959.69 
 
Furthermore, there were clearly areas in which Philip had little direct role. 
There is no sign of Philip’s input into Macmillan’s efforts to reshape defence 
organisation and policy at the start and end of his premiership, despite its 
obvious relevance to the projection of foreign policy. He could, however, advise 
on mistakes, observing in 1958: ‘By some extraordinary muddle the Chiefs of 
Staff in their paper have commended on the wrong Foreign Office paper. 
Consequently I am afraid that many of their remarks are irrelevant’.70 
 
There was little private office involvement in the policy review exercise under 
Eden which in 1956 produced a paper – but little else – on ‘The future of the 
UK in world affairs’. This policy review effort was led by Sir Norman Brook 
and the Cabinet Office and the private office contribution consisted of little 
more than Bishop’s doubt ‘whether this grandiose exercise will really produce 
much additional help’.71 This did not deter Macmillan from launching the even 
more grandiose ‘Future Policy’ exercise in 1959. This attempt to sketch in 
broad strategy for after that autumn’s general election commenced with a 
Chequers meeting on 7 June 1959. The Cabinet Office, Foreign Office, Ministry 
of Defence and Treasury – the departments that would lead on the project – 
were all well-represented. The Prime Minister’s private office was represented 
not by Philip but by Tim Bligh, a home civil servant who joined from the 
Treasury earlier that year.72 One of the few contributions Philip seems to have 
made was the prescient observation that the TSR-2 strike aircraft might not be 
required, though cancellation of this project was left to the next Labour 
government.73 
 
Philip in fact is not even mentioned in Macmillan’s diaries – and then only en 
passant – before 23 October 1957. By the following summer, however, Philip 
seems to have become much more of a confidant, being invited with his wife to 
69 Macmillan, Riding the Storm pp.553, 615. 
70 TNA: PREM11/2347, de Zulueta to Macmillan, 19 March 1958. 
71 TNA: PREM11/1778, Bishop to Hunt, 18 October 1956; PREM11/2321, Brook to Macmillan, 25 November 
1957; Bishop to Macmillan, 26 November 1957. 
72 TNA: CAB134/1929, meeting at Chequers, 7 June 1959. 
73 TNA: PREM11/2946, de Zulueta to Brook, 31 August 1960. 
                                                          
Chequers for a weekend of broad conversations.74 It seems that their 
relationship had clearly blossomed into personal friendship by summer 1959, 
with Philip and Marie-Lou being invited down to Macmillan’s private estate of 
Birch Grove in Sussex during a family weekend.75 
 
By then Philip had proved his worth to Macmillan through his work on a 
specific policy problem the Prime Minister had been wrestling with earlier 
when Foreign Secretary in 1955. By 1957 Macmillan had moved to trying to 
solve the terrorism in Cyprus and related Graeco-Turkish tensions with the idea 
of a tridominium on the island preserving the British sovereign bases. Faced 
with intransigence from both Turks and Greeks in March 1958 Macmillan 
undertook to redraft the plan. He was aided by ‘an excellent draft from de 
Zulueta’.76 That summer Philip accompanied Macmillan on a visit to the island. 
He was party to the discussions at Chequers on 8 September 1958 with the 
Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd, the Governor of Cyprus Sir Hugh Foot, 
Macmillan and John Addis of the Foreign Office about when to allow 
Archbishop Makarios to return to the island. He also played an important role in 
drafting statements about Cyprus for parliament.77 
 
Philip was if anything even more valuable as a steadying hand during the crisis 
precipitated by the coup in Iraq of 14 July 1958. This removed what had been 
the linchpin of Britain’s position in the Middle East. Macmillan’s son-in-law, 
Julian Amery, immediately advocated action to try to reconquer Iraq. As he had 
been a leading member of the Suez group of Tory MPs advocating action 
against Nasser’s Egypt two years earlier, this was hardly surprising. Amery was, 
however, joined by the Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, in enthusiasm 
for using figures like Colonel de Gaury – an old friend of the Iraqi royal family 
– to try to stir up counter-revolution.78 Philip was instrumental in getting the 
Foreign Office to warn Macmillan against such adventures. Of a later Amery 
paper Philip noted: ‘If he is right we shall I think have either to bring down 
Nasser by military means or lose all our favourable position over oil supplies 
from the Middle East.’ But, he went on to advise ‘this is such an unattractive 
74 DWM: Harold Macmillan diaries [henceforward HMD], 31 August 1958. 
75 DWM: HMD, 4 July 1959. 
76 DWM: HMD, 8 March 1958. 
77 Catterall, Prime Minister and After p.149 (11 August 1958), p.157 (6 September 1958); DWM: HMD, 10 
December 1958. 
78 TNA: PREM 11/2397, Amery to Macmillan, 15 July 1958; PREM 11/2416, Lennox-Boyd to Macmillan, 16 July 
1958. 
                                                          
dilemma that we should seek to avoid it if we can and I do not believe that we 
are yet quite faced with it.’79 It was this wise counsel that prevailed. 
 
Philip was thus effective at weighing political risks  for his chief. It is 
interesting that Millard described him as ‘imaginative’.80 Macmillan’s supple 
mind was constantly probing for broad plans – what he called ‘Grand Designs’ 
– through which to tackle the issues he confronted. Those officials he invited 
periodically for general, wide-ranging discussions to address these were not 
necessarily the most senior, but those whose thinking he found congenial – 
Philip, for instance, felt that it was important to encourage contact with the 
Soviets, a view Macmillan had also developed when Foreign Secretary – and 
conducive to exploring the solutions he sought.81 Their role was to help 
Macmillan to tease out the interlocking policy devices he tended to favour. 
Accordingly, these sessions acted like impromptu policy seminars, helping the 
Prime Minister to crystallise his thoughts on, for instance, responses to the 
connected problems of the Soviet threats to Berlin in November 1958 and the 
need to reduce tension in the Cold War when many in the West (wrongly) 
believed that the Russians had a nuclear lead and political problems were 
gathering through the related fear of the consequences of nuclear testing.82 
Philip was amongst those officials, including Bishop and Rumbold, Macmillan 
invited for one of these very long conversations over luncheon at Chequers in 
January 1959. The upshot was to help the Prime Minister to decide to address 
these issues through the device of the probing visit to Moscow which Philip 
accompanied him on the following month, with follow-up visits to western 
capitals, including Washington.83 
 
Before they left Philip warned Macmillan that recent press reports suggesting 
that the West German people were becoming more favourable to neutrality as a 
means of securing reunification might make it more difficult to secure 
concessions from the Russians. This indicates that part of Philip’s job was to 
keep the Prime Minister of the context in which his foreign policy was 
operating. It might have been helpful if he had also warned that this situation 
79 TNA: PREM 11/2416, de Zulueta to D. C. Symon, 19 July 1958, to Macmillan, 29 July 1958; PREM 11/2397, de 
Zulueta to Macmillan, 10 September 1958. 
80 Telephone conversation with Sir Guy Millard, 28 August 2012. 
81 Richard Aldous, Macmillan, Eisenhower and the Cold War (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2005), p.31; Catterall, 
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would also make the West German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, much more 
sensitive to Macmillan’s visit. Adenauer never really trusted Macmillan again.  
 
This might suggest that there was a downside to having in such a central 
advisory role a figure sharing and reinforcing Macmillan’s view that German 
reunification was a subsidiary problem of the Cold War and other wider global 
problems and disinclined to compensate for his master’s tendency to underplay 
German anxieties.84 Philip, like Macmillan, seems not to have readily noticed 
the way in which Anglo-German relations soured after de Gaulle in the autumn 
of 1958 set out to woo the aged Chancellor. He had recognised by December 
1958 that the FTA negotiations were abortive, but continued to see the problem 
essentially in terms of threatening rather than persuading the Germans, in the 
hope of gaining leverage on the French. Thus at the end of the year he wrote to 
Macmillan ‘If we alarm the Germans sufficiently we might, perhaps, cause 
them to put such pressure on the French that the Common Market would 
collapse or be very much watered down’.85  
 
The scheme Philip subsequently put forward in October 1959 further 
compounded the offence caused by the Moscow trip in Adenauer’s eyes. The 
idea of an Anglo-Soviet arms limitation agreement in central Europe he then 
raised had obvious strategic and pecuniary benefits for the overstretched British; 
however, far from proving, as Philip hoped, a means of bullying the Germans 
into supporting wider European unity, it was only likely to continue to drive 
Adenauer into the arms of de Gaulle.86 As Macmillan astutely observed, the 
French liked to pretend  
 
[T]hat we are weak and defeatist, and that they are for ‘being tough’. The 
purpose of this is to impress Chancellor Adenauer, and keep his support 
in their protectionist attitude towards European economic problems.87  
 
Some sort of Anglo-Soviet rapprochement was nevertheless clearly desirable. 
Through reducing international tension it would reduce military expenditure. 
But it would also increase Britain’s room for manoeuvre. In consequence 
84 TNA: PREM11/2708, de Zulueta to Macmillan, 18 February 1959; Sabine Lee An Ueasy Partnership: British-
German Relations between 1955 and 1961 (Bochum: Universitätsverlag Dr. N. Brockmeyer, 1996), p.71. 
85 TNA: PREM11/2826, de Zulueta to Macmillan, 30 December 1958. 
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Gaulle (London: I. B Tauris, 2006), p.91. 
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British foreign policy would no longer be so dependent upon the US. The 
problem that ‘Western policy on Germany is to a large extent a prisoner of the 
Federal Government’, with concomitant stationing costs, would also be 
diminished.88 Nuclear weapons were felt to have rendered redundant the large 
forces that Adenauer still demanded that his allies maintained in Germany. 
Furthermore, it might also help to slow Soviet penetration in both the Middle 
East and Africa. To combat this Macmillan advocated freer trade and greater 
Western unity. Indeed, his African tour of 1960 very much arose from this 
context, culminating in his warning in Cape Town in February that if the West 
did not respond to the ‘wind of change’ of nationalism blowing through the 
continent ‘we may imperil the precarious balance between the East and West on 
which the peace of the world depends’.89 
 
All these factors, together with political imperatives regarding the October 1959 
election and the personal inclinations of both Philip and Macmillan, ensured a 
growing emphasis on the need for a four-power summit after the Moscow visit.  
In the process Philip could temper the Prime Minister’s inclination to run ahead 
of what his Allies would stomach, as is clear from their very private exchange 
of August 1959 in response to the latest Khrushchev letter about Berlin.90 
Nevertheless, Philip clearly also supported Macmillan’s goals. Lloyd, who did 
not entirely share their enthusiasm, certainly seems to have felt that the policy 
which culminated in the Paris summit of May 1960 was at least as much 
Philip’s as Macmillan’s, hence his bitter comments then about ‘government by 
private secretary’.91 It was Philip, not Lloyd, who accompanied the Prime 
Minister on the key trips to Paris and Camp David on the road to the summit. 
He also helped Macmillan to respond to Khrushchev’s communications after the 
shooting down of an American U2 overflying the Soviet Union on spying 
mission imperilled the impending meeting.92 The following day, 11 May 1960, 
he sought to reassure his chief that the U2 incident was being used by the Soviet 
leader to sabre-rattle to keep in check his enemies at home and did not mean 
that the conference was doomed, in contrast to the gloomy prognostications 
88 TNA: PREM11/2347, ‘British Policy on Germany and European Security’, January 1958. Philip reiterated 
concerns about these costs in a letter to The Times, 9 November 1976. 
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91 Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd, pp.303-4. 
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coming from the British ambassador, Sir Patrick Reilly, in Moscow. This 
overly-sanguine, if not self-deluding optimism suggests how much Philip had 
personally invested in success in Paris, a view reinforced by his part in 
Macmillan’s last-ditch efforts to prevent a breakdown. His subsequent comment 
to Alistair Horne that, after this failure, ‘I never saw [Macmillan] more 
depressed’ is often quoted, but it is hard to escape the sense that Philip was here 
expressing his own sentiments as well.93 
 
Thereafter the British not only had to try to pick out some alternative policy, but 
also respond to the impending change of President in the US. Eisenhower, 
Macmillan’s wartime colleague, was coming to the end of his term. The 
Democrat candidate to replace him, John F. Kennedy, Philip warned in June 
1960, had told a garden party in the South of France the previous year ‘the 
British have made such a mess of things in the world and especially in the 
Middle East that the best thing they can do is keep out of it in future’.94 Such 
attitudes presented a problem when Kennedy subsequently took the White 
House. Macmillan rapidly concluded that he could no longer rely on 
 
[T]he link of memories and a long friendship. I will have to base myself 
now on trying to win him by ideas. I have started working on a 
memorandum wh[ich] I might send him – giving a broad survey of the 
problems wh[ich] face us in the world.95 
 
It is not clear whether this approach was influenced by Philip, but a subsequent 
memorandum from the latter shows that he came to similar conclusions.96   
 
He also seems to have come to similar conclusions regarding the ideas 
Macmillan then sketched out. This required something of a shift on his part. 
After the FTA failure Philip had felt French hostility to any kind of trade deal 
with Britain was such that ‘our only course is either to try and break up the 
Common Market or watering it down’.97 Although a great Francophile who 
wrote many position papers for Macmillan on Anglo-French affairs, Philip 
continued to feel of the French in October 1959 ‘At the moment I do not think 
93 Aldous, pp.134-5, 148-9, 158; Horne, p.231. 
94 TNA: PREM11/3169, de Zulueta to Macmillan, 1 June 1960. 
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they do want us at all’.98 However, it was increasingly clear that the alternative 
course Macmillan had been pursuing, of some kind of accommodation between 
the Six and the Seven – the countries of the Common Market and the European 
Free Trade Association that Britain had formed as an alternative – was a non-
starter. One of Macmillan’s old friends from his days in the European League 
for Economic Co-operation, Juliet Rhys-Williams, wrote to Philip in December 
1960 about the difficulties of achieving such an accommodation in the face of 
GATT rules.99 Informal external advisers like Rhys-Williams had been 
important to Macmillan when out of power in the late 1940s and into the early 
1950s, a period when Europe remained a fluid concept. Now, with the Hallstein 
tariffs of July 1960, the Common Market in contrast was a present reality which 
threatened British trade. 
 
Macmillan’s solution was to work up his initial ideas for Kennedy in December 
1960 into a ‘Grand Design’ paper. This paper distilled various policy proposals 
in the aftermath of the summit failure. It sought to liberalise international trade 
and aid in order to: provide a non-inflationary external stimulus to the UK 
economy; consolidate resistance to communism; reduce military costs. These 
were largely consistent with earlier policy devices such as the FTA concept, but 
the means was now through an exploration of whether some kind of 
accommodation was possible with the Common Market created by the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957.100  
 
The ‘Grand Design’ paper was drafted with the aid of a small circle of Philip, 
Bishop and Brook.101 It was by no means exclusively about European entry. 
Reflecting the recurring significance of the Cold War in Philip’s thought, he 
advised that the ‘Soviet fear of Germany and the spread of nuclear weapons 
might come in useful in th[is] enterprise’.102 This is because hopes of making 
progress with de Gaulle seem to have rested upon: a) persuading Kennedy to 
support the project, including by allowing nuclear information sharing with the 
French; b) reducing tensions over Berlin. On the first of these Macmillan 
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recorded ‘most satisfactory’ progress when accompanied by Philip to the White 
House in April 1961. However, whilst Kennedy was certainly supportive over 
the envisaged Common Market entry negotiations, he was to oppose the nuclear 
information sharing with the French which Philip and Macmillan had dangled 
before de Gaulle at what the Prime Minister considered a successful meeting at 
Rambouillet in January.103 Taking the view that de Gaulle was more interested 
in being the strongman of Europe than contributing usefully to tackling the Cold 
War, the Americans thus denied Macmillan a key means of leverage on the 
French.104 
 
The second goal proved no less tricky. Soviet fears were indeed evident in their 
desire to consolidate the division of Germany, reflected in the building of the 
Berlin Wall that summer. This, however, simply made de Gaulle even more 
reluctant to consider negotiations with the Soviets that were likely to prove 
unpalatable to Adenauer when Macmillan and Philip met with him at Birch 
Grove in November 1961.105 
 
Philip was heavily involved with the gestation, development and 
communication of this Grand Design both to British and overseas audiences.106  
This suggests that he was, by this stage if not earlier, more than a private 
secretary or a policy adviser. He it was, rather than the Foreign Secretary (by 
then Lord Home) who generally accompanied the Prime Minister on the visits 
whereby the policy advanced. By May 1962, however, little had been achieved. 
The ministerial meetings in Brussels were deadlocked. Pessimistic views were 
also being presented to Philip to pass on to the Prime Minister. The American 
journalist Joseph Alsop, for instance, told Philip over lunch that he was 
convinced de Gaulle did not want Britain in Europe and that nor, in the 
aftermath of the Anglo-American handling of the Berlin Wall crisis, did 
Adenauer; a verdict Philip recorded as unduly unfavourable, though there might 
be a ‘certain truth in what he says’.107 Macmillan was coming to similar views 
about de Gaulle’s attitudes, convening a dinner at Chequers on 27 May 1962 to 
discuss responses at which Philip joined Home, chief European negotiator Ted 
Heath, Sir Harold Caccia (permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office), Sir 
103 Catterall, Prime Minister and After p.358 (29 January 1961), p.372 (8 April 1961); Mangold, p.155. 
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Frank Lee (permanent under-secretary at the Board of Trade) and Sir Pierson 
Dixon (ambassador to France). This was in preparation for his visit, 
accompanied by Philip and Dixon, to de Gaulle at Château des Champs on 2-3 
June. Philip seems to have returned from this with a sanguine assessment.108 
Although Macmillan could not play the nuclear card, following earlier advice 
from Philip, he did emphasise military co-operation in Europe.109 Macmillan 
also felt that he had convinced de Gaulle that Britain regarded it as in their 
interest to join the Six ‘if reasonable terms can be made, esp[ecially] for the old 
Commonwealth countries’.110 
 
The latter, however, were not necessarily any more enthusiastic about British 
entry than de Gaulle. Philip’s next major task was therefore helping to draft 
Macmillan’s speech for the upcoming Commonwealth conference at which he 
would try to sell the policy. His important role in drafting or improving such 
speeches illustrates that he contributed significantly to the articulation of 
Macmillan’s policy.111 However, not all his advice was heeded; for instance, his 
concern that the creation of Malaysia in 1962 would amongst other risks 
overburden military relations with Australia and New Zealand.112 On the other 
hand, during the Cuban crisis that October his warning to American intelligence 
officer Chet Cooper of the likely scepticism of the British press seems to have 
been a significant factor in the American decision to publish photographs of the 
Soviet missile sites.113 Philip was thus much more than a conduit (as in his 
communications with Kennedy’s National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, 
during the Cuban missile crisis), a bag-carrier or interpreter. He also offered an 
informal, plausibly-deniable channel of information for representatives of other 
countries. Thus in February 1961 he was invited to luncheon by Alex Romanov, 
the minister-counsellor at the Soviet embassy. For the Russians this was a 
means of exploring British attitudes to the Laos crisis that was then very much 
exercising the incoming Kennedy administration.114 Splendid meals and vodka 
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at the Ritz and Café Royal over the next two years became a regular means of 
sounding out Soviet and British positions on issues from the Congo or China to 
the nuclear test ban that Macmillan sought so persistently from 1959, even if 
Philip could complain to the Foreign Office that Romanov’s ‘detailed 
knowledge of the Soviet negotiating position was better than my understanding 
of ours’.115  
 
Philip similarly dined informally and strategically for Britain with journalists 
like Alsop or the French and American ambassadors. For instance, following 
the Château des Champs meeting he arranged a couple of private dinners with 
Geoffroy de Courcel, the new French ambassador. His predecessor, Paul 
Chauvel, had a reputation of being too anglophile to reliably transmit de 
Gaulle’s views.116 In contrast, although Philip was able to use these meetings to 
convey Macmillan’s dismay at de Gaulle’s remarks on his September 1962 visit 
to Adenauer, de Courcel – formerly de Gaulle’s personal aide – kept his cards 
close to his chest.117 They do not seem to have helped to prepare for the 
December 1962 meeting at Rambouillet with the General at which, as 
Macmillan puts it in his diaries, ‘Philip de Z acted as my chief adviser and 
secretary’.118 These talks, according to Macmillan, were ‘as bad as they c[oul]d 
be from the European point of view’. The French President, taking the line that 
British entry would subordinate Europe both to America and the 
Commonwealth, was clearly bent on refusal.119 Going into the talks Macmillan 
had continued to place hope in some nuclear agreement to give him leverage 
with de Gaulle. According to Philip, the problem was that the Prime Minister 
was not always as proficient at French as he liked to think, and the General – 
who he felt was only interested in nuclear weapons for prestige reasons – did 
not fully grasp the British offer.120 
 
At the same time nuclear relations with the Americans were becoming critical. 
Almost straight after Rambouillet Philip accompanied Macmillan to Nassau for 
Anglo-American talks in which the future of the British deterrent bulked large. 
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At issue was whether the British could acquire a credible missile to launch 
nuclear warheads, having cancelled their own Blue Streak development in 1960 
in favour of the American Skybolt, a programme the Administration had just 
decided to discontinue. Back then Philip had presciently argued in favour of the 
alternative submarine-based missiles, pointing out ‘Unless we have an option to 
buy or build Polaris we ourselves get nothing out of giving the Americans 
[nuclear] facilities in Scotland’.121 Britain had proved unable to secure an option 
on Polaris in 1960, but at Nassau a sleight of hand over the alignment of 
Britain’s deterrent secured these missiles for the Americans’ disgruntled ally. 
The Americans wished to present the Nassau deal as part of the Multilateral 
Force [MLF] through which they were trying to deter the West Germans from 
developing their own nuclear weapons.122 When Alsop complained a few 
months later that everywhere in Europe British representatives were speaking 
against the MLF, Philip did his ‘best to assure him this must be nonsense’.123 
His assurance was almost certainly disingenuous. Philip no doubt shared 
widespread British doubts about the MLF concept, which eventually ran into the 
sands in 1967. Instead the Nassau episode reinforced for Philip that  
 
our “special relationship” with the United States is not worth much in real 
terms….so that we had better start reinforcing ourselves vis-à-vis the 
Americans by an independent policy in concert with someone else, e.g. 
the French.124 
 
Working over the weekend at Chequers with Philip on 28 January 1963, 
Macmillan sadly reflected on the lack of prospect of progress with the French as 
the entry talks ground to a halt. ‘If it were not’, he complained, ‘for the fatal 
survival of Dr Adenauer (the Pétain of Germany) we c[oul]d hope for a firm 
stand by the Germans’.125 Macmillan, unlike Eden, had developed an uneasy 
relationship with Adenauer. Indeed, Eden noted of his dinner with the West 
German delegation during their November 1959 visit to Macmillan the 
Chancellor’s bitter complaints about the lack of clear British policy towards his 
121 Cited in Richard Lamb, The Macmillan Years: The Emerging Truth (London: John Murray, 1995), p.293. 
122 Peter Catterall, ‘Roles and Relationships: Dean Acheson, “British Decline” and Post-War Anglo-American 
Relations’ in Antoine Capet and Aissatou Sy-Wonyu (eds), The Special Relationship (Rouen: Université de 
Rouen, 2003), pp.115-17. 
123 TNA: PREM11/4575, de Zulueta to J. O. Wright (FO), 26 March 1963. 
124 Cited in Lamb, The Macmillan Years p.292. 
125 Catterall, Prime Minister and After p.536. 
                                                          
country.126 Philip does not seem materially to have helped to tackle this 
deficiency, later approvingly recording the observations of Llewellyn 
Thompson, the American ambassador to Russia, that ‘American conversations 
with the Federal Government were becoming rather like their conversations 
with the Russians in that they had a stock series of arguments which they had to 
continually employ’.127 
 
More success was in fact achieved in 1963 in conversations with the Americans 
and Russians than the French and Germans. Philip was part of the luncheon 
party Macmillan convened on 8 March 1963 to discuss how to break the 
deadlock in the test ban talks. With Philip’s help in drafting proposals 
Macmillan proceeded to woo Kennedy’s support for progress, culminating in 
the President’s visit to Birch Grove on 29-30 June. The Prime Minister regarded 
this as a great success: ‘We got all we wanted. 
1) Full steam ahead with Moscow talks – Test Ban to be no. 1 priority 
2) Go slow on Multi-Manned.128 
 
Philip’s duties over this weekend included taking his fellow Catholic, Kennedy, 
to Mass. He later told Richard Thorpe of his shock that the President only 
seemed interested in pumping Philip for the salacious details of the ongoing 
Profumo scandal.129 This was by no means the only occasion when Philip’s 
Catholicism proved useful. His personal and familial connections with the 
Catholic hierarchy meant he was well-placed to keep Macmillan abreast of 
developments within the Holy See and to represent the Prime Minister at the 
coronation mass for John XXIII in 1958 and the requiem mass after his death in 
1963. So good were these connections that the Sunday Express could credibly, 
if mendaciously, allege to Evans prime ministerial involvement in the selection 
of a new Archbishop of Westminster in 1963.130 
 
Philip meanwhile sought to help Macmillan to reopen some of the well-worn 
foreign policy objectives they had persistently pursued. For instance, following 
Birch Grove, Kennedy’s letter to Macmillan drawing attention to the possibility 
of Franco-German objections to the test ban talks prompted the fertile minds of 
both Prime Minister and adviser to look again at nuclear relations with France. 
126 AP: 23/3/18, Eden note, 1 May 1968; Catterall, Prime Minister and After, p.258 (19 November 1959). 
127 TNA: PREM11/4578, de Zulueta to Douglas-Home, 14 November 1963. 
128 Catterall, Prime Minister and After p.575 (7 July 1963). 
129 Email from D. R. Thorpe, 13 September 2012. 
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Thoughts of using American acquiescence at last to nuclear information sharing 
with the French as a means of persuading them to drop their objections to the 
proposed test ban led Macmillan to enthuse:  
 
We might even revise Europe – (Common Market) etc and start a new 
and hopeful movement to straighten out the whole alliance….I put my 
ideas through de Zulueta to a small drafting ctee (1 F.O. and 1 MofD 
man) wh[ich] he dominated.131 
 
Philip, charged with drafting yet another paper on Anglo-French nuclear 
relations, sought to find a price in a memorandum written on September 1963 
which ‘we want, the French would give, and the Americans would not dislike’. 
The French reaction to the signing of the Test Ban Treaty on 25 July 1963 in 
Moscow however demonstrated that this remained an impossible proposition.132 
 
Philip’s perennial efforts to tackle Anglo-French relations thus ended in failure. 
A month later Macmillan, having at length decided to continue as Premier until 
the next election, was stricken by the prostate problem that prompted his 
retirement. Two days before Macmillan’s resignation Philip visited his hospital 
bed to tell the Prime Minister that he had decided to go to the City rather than 
return to the Foreign Office.133 By kind permission of Rab Butler, who 
succeeded the incoming Prime Minister at the Foreign Office, a leaving party 
was held at Foreign Secretary’s London residence, 1 Carlton Gardens, on 12 
December 1963.134 A month later Philip, having been knighted in Macmillan’s 
resignation honours list, became a banker with Philip Hill-Higginson Erlanges.  
 
There ensued some controversy both about the knighthood and about Philip’s 
decision to leave the diplomatic service. His old chief, Geoffrey McDermott, 
later gave this as an example of the wastage of talent by the Foreign Office. 
Both John Wyndham and Macmillan’s official biographer, Alistair Horne, felt 
this put a premature end to a career in which Philip could have risen to the top. 
The latter suggests that the length of his service in the private office, and 
resulting identification with Macmillan, was an obstacle to returning to 
131 JFKL: NSF174, Kennedy to Macmillan, 10 July 1963; DWM: HMD, 18 July 1963. 
132 Mangold, pp.207-10. 
133 Catterall, Prime Minister and After p.608 (16 October 1963). 
134 AP: 23/67/40, invitation card. 
                                                          
diplomatic life.135 Philip certainly stayed in Number 10 longer than any of the 
other private secretaries with whom he served. Indeed, the only other to rival 
him in length of service (and the only other to receive a knighthood courtesy of 
Macmillan) was Tim Bligh, who also joined Philip in moving to the private 
sector. This, however, was surely largely down to personal choice. In the private 
office he had a master who shared his views and valued and relied upon him, 
plus a roving ability to influence foreign policy broadly in a manner not 
generally possible for a lowly Grade 7. Going back to the Foreign Office would 
mean resuming the slow climb to the top in a world made more competitive by 
the many diplomats of his age drafted in after the Second World War. As 
Moorhouse later noted, the age of 35 (Philip in 1963 was 38) is often a plateau 
in the diplomatic corps: after that the career structure becomes more pyramidal. 
The result, as Wyndham pointed out, is that promising civil servants like Philip 
could find it a long wait for advancement. Not many, either, were in Philip’s 
position to instead get tempting offers to shift to the City. He turned down a 
Washington posting and formally left the Foreign Office on 17 January 1964.136  
 
In addition to his City career, Philip became a trustee both of the trust set up to 
manage Macmillan’s memoirs and literary legacy and the Kennedy Memorial 
Trust. In 1965 he wrote to Eden asking for his support in efforts to gain the 
Conservative nomination for the constituency of the Cities of London and 
Westminster ‘since it was at your feet that I first became really interested in 
politics’. There had been suspicions that such political sympathies had also been 
a reason for his decision to leave the civil service. However, as Philip pointed 
out when ambushed by a television interviewer on this point in Lusaka in 1964, 
it was not he but his wife who had more problems stomaching the idea of him 
working for the Labour government which, following the 1964 election, was by 
then in office.137 Party politics was not the reason for his departure from 
Whitehall. Nor did he pursue it strongly. Despite Macmillan’s coaching, 
however, the attempt to win the nomination for this promising seat proved 
unsuccessful, whilst career considerations precluded him chasing others.138 This 
episode, however, illustrates that Philip remained close to the former Prime 
Minister, advising him both on the international financial situation (useful in 
135 McDermott, p.217; Wyndham, p.191; Horne, p.571. 
136 Strang, The Diplomatic Career p.45; Moorhouse, pp.93-5; Wyndham, p.191; Foreign Office List (1964), 
p.449; Interview: Lady de Zulueta, 24 October 2012. 
137 Interview: Lady de Zulueta, 24 October 2012. 
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Macmillan’s resumed role at the eponymous publishing firm) and the handling 
of misleading allegations made about Rambouillet by the Labour Prime 
Minister, Harold Wilson, during the 1966 general election.139 Philip was well-
aware of Wilson’s position on the nuclear issue, having reported of a 
transatlantic conversation with the then Leader of the Opposition in November 
1963, that Wilson’s objection was not to British warheads but to the purchase of 
American missiles.140 
 
Macmillan remained a would-be patron, unsuccessfully nominating Philip as a 
potential ambassador to Washington in 1970. Macmillan’s tribute says much 
about his continuing regard for the man who served him so closely: 
 
He is extremely able….and has made a considerable reputation in his 
knowledge of financial and economic affairs particularly in the European 
field. He knows a lot about both theoretical and applied economics. He 
has kept pretty close his friendships and connections with the diplomatic 
world. He has a charming and efficient wife….Here is a man who is still 
under fifty, known and respected in governing circles in almost every 
capital, with the unique experience of how No. 10 and the Foreign Office 
must work together.141 
 
These virtues helped to make Philip a key asset to Macmillan, someone with 
whom during weekends at Chequers together they would clear their 
correspondence and crystallise views on foreign policy issues around the world. 
He thus served as much more than a private secretary, or even a special adviser. 
Philip became a confidant for a lonely Prime Minister who relied heavily on 
friendships in the private office to compensate both for an unhappy marriage 
and the gradual loss of political companions, particularly after the self-inflicted 
wounds of the botched Cabinet reshuffle of July 1962. To some extent Philip 
even became a co-producer of policy, as demonstrated by his contribution to 
continuity in objectives both before and after the 1960 Summit. This close 
working relationship was based upon a similarity of view which meant that the 
Prime Minister could trust Philip to draft for him, represent him and be his eyes 
and ears in Whitehall and beyond. As Macmillan later reflected, ‘Philip knows 
139 Catterall, Prime Minister and After, pp.660, 677-9. 
140 TNA: PREM11/4332, de Zulueta, note for the record, 24 November 1963. 
141 DWM: MS Macmillan, dep. c. 539, Macmillan to Douglas-Home, 23 July 1970. 
                                                          
my mind’.142 He could calm a sometimes overwrought Premier. Philip also 
provided invaluable insights in subsequently reading drafts of Macmillan’s 
memoirs. 
 
Nevertheless, this meeting of minds was almost too symbiotic, amplifying some 
concerns such as the need to reduce tensions with Russia. Both men also held 
similar attitudes towards Germany. They shared not only policy imperatives, but 
also certain character traits. A common penchant for understated, ironic humour 
comes across in the relaxed correspondence that passed between them.143 They 
were also both apt to express themselves elliptically on occasion. These 
similarities no doubt ensured Philip’s indispensability as a companion to 
Macmillan. They also helped to reinforce Macmillan’s foreign policy 
preferences. Arguably, however, Philip was not always as successful at putting 
forward alternatives to what Macmillan wished to achieve, partly because he 
shared so closely the Prime Minister’s views. He was thus not an independent 
source of advice. Accordingly, therefore, Philip’s very closeness to and 
importance as a foreign policy adviser for Macmillan also somewhat diminished 
his overall effectiveness in that role. 
142 Cited in Egremont, p.1023. 
143 For instance, on a memorandum noting that Labour would oppose British nuclear tests but not American 
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